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RESCUE SHIPS
cyr: The original convoy orders, printed on the sailing plan, laid down that the rear ship of each column should act as rescue ship in the event of sinking of one of the ships ahead of her. Although the rescue of survivors is an automatic reaction of any seaman, the task imposed considerable danger to the rescuer. Also the freeboard of a freighter or tanker in ballast, and the unwieldy nature of merchant ships' boats, made recovery of men in the water very difficult. As soon as this problem became apparent with the increased sinkings of ships after-mid 1940, the Admiralty sought to requisition certain small vessels for the specific duty of Rescue Ships. These were principally small freighters with passenger accommodation, and a good deal of work was required to fit them for their new role. In view of the physical and morale advantage of dedicated Rescue vessels, it is surprising that the MOWT actively opposed the allocation of additional vessels after the initial conversions. Although the allocation was finally agreed, when a further need for more ships arose later in the war, five CASTLE class corvettes on the ways but surplus to escort needs were converted to the rescue role. These ships survived postwar as small troopships in Army service in the Mediterranean. Description Two-berth cabins were built in the tween-deck spaces for officer survivors, while messdecks with bunk or hammock accommodation for up to 150 men were also provided. Galley and food storage areas were enlarged as needed, additional sanitary arrangements made and a properly fitted sick bay and operating theatre provided with accommodation for a naval doctor and sick bay staff. Boats more suitable for open sea work were provided in lieu of the standard lifeboats, as were recovery aids such as scrambling nets and the like. The completed vessels were allocated to convoys as a specific Rescue Ships and usually stationed at the rear of the centre column of the convoy. The Master was under the control of the Commodore, while responding to the requests of the Senior Officer of the Escort and reporting submarine bearings, etc direct to him. An additional benefit of the Rescue Ships was that almost all were eventually fitted with High Frequency Direction Finding equipment, and three Radio Officers specially trained in its use were embarked additional to the normal complement. They were therefore able to take bearings on enemy radio transmissions and pass these to the SOE to provide a cross bearing in conjunction with his set. This facility added materially to the defence of the convoy and was of great value to the Escort Commander. A feature of the Rescue Ships was the consistent service of many of their crews. Masters were meticulous in their recruitment of crews, with very positive views on seamanship. One Master recruited his deck complement solely from Hebridean seamen, renowned for their seamanship and boat-handling ability. There was continuous development of recovery and transfer tactics, and of specialised equipment, developed through experience by the crews them- selves. The shore organization, Clyde based, provided by the PSTO ensured that such improvements were monitored, approved and the knowledge at once passed to other Rescue Ships. The PSTO, Clyde, appointed a specific Rescue Ship Officer in June 1941 whose sole responsibility thereafter was the fitting out and general care of all Rescue Ships. Later a further officer was appointed as Inspecting Officer charged with the care of the Rescue Ships when in port in Glasgow. As the incumbents remained in office throughout the remainder of the war, continuity and very close personal involvement was ensured, a fact undoubtedly adding greatly to the effectiveness of the organization. Surprisingly, given their exposure to attack during their work, relatively few of the Rescue Ships were lost. They were greatly admired both by their colleagues in the convoy and by the crews of escort vessels, and escorts went to considerable lengths whenever possible to give cover to "their" Rescue Ship. From their introduction to the North Atlantic convoy routes in late 1940 (the system was later extended to cover other major routes including North Russia) 4,194 survivors were picked up; 2,296 Britons, 951 Americans, 369 Norwegians, 141 Greeks, 104 Russians, 81 Panamanians, 75 Dutch, 56 French, 40 Latvians, 34 Swedes, 21 Yugoslavs, 20 Filipino, 2 Czechs and 4 German U-boat survivors from a total of 119 ships. These figures include 32 aircrew picked up as a result of crashes, principally from MAC ships of the convoy. Seven hundred and ninety-seven voyages in convoy were recorded over a distance of some two and a quarter million miles. The attribution of nationality is that given by the Rescue Service. It is probable that this was decided by the nationality of the Register upon which the ship appeared. Thus "Panamanian" is quite likely to consist largely of American seamen. British DEMS ratings serving in Dutch or Norwegian ships might well also be listed under those nationalities. The foregoing is only the briefest survey of a little known group of important ships. Convoy Rescue Ships 1940-45 by this author, published November 1998 by World Ship Society, ISBN 0 905617 88 6, contains more detailed research. List of Rescue Ships In the list below, the ship's name is followed by her gross registered tonnage/year of build. The date on which the ship became operational appears next, followed by the number of convoys in which she took part and the total of numbers rescued. Finally, a note shows the ships lost with relevant data. [pre2] ABOYNE 1,020/37 11/06/43 26 20 ACCRINGTON 1,678/10 26/07/42 36 141 BEACHY 1,600/36 7/01/41 5 - Sunk 11/1/41 by aircraft BURY 1,686/11 27/12/41 48 237 COPELAND 1,526/23 29/01/41 71 433 DEWSBURY 1,686/10 29/09/41 43 5 DUNDEE 1,541/34 08/08/43 24 11 EDDYSTONE 1,500/27 06/11/43 24 64 EMPIRE COMFORT 1,333/45 25/02/45 8 - EMPIRE LIFEGUARD 1,333/44 07/03/45 6 - EMPIRE PEACEMAKER 1,333/45 10/02/45 8 3 EMPIRE REST 1,327/44 12/11/44 11 - EMPIRE SHELTER 1,336/45 16/04/45 6 - FASTNET 1,415/28 07/10/43 25 35 GOODWIN 1,569/17 28/04/43 25 133 GOTHLAND 1,286/32 05/02/42 41 149 HONTESTROOM 1,875/21 11/01/41 11 69 Withdrawn from service 5/41 MELROSE ABBEY 1,908/29 11/02/42 46 85 PERTH 2,258/15 05/05/41 60 455 PINTO 1,346/28 05/12/42 10 2 Sunk 8/9/44 by U 482 RATHLIN 1,599/36 02/10/41 47 634 STCLAIR 1,636/37 01/07/44 14 - STSUNNIVA 1,368/31 07/12/42 1 - Foundered 23/1/43, probably due to icing up STOCKPORT 1,683/11 22/10/41 16 413 Sunk 23/2/43 by U 604 SYRIAN PRINCE 1,989/36 18/11/43 19 - TJALDUR 1,130/16 26/10/41 3 - Withdrawn as unsuitable 12/41 TOWARD 1,571/23 24/10/41 45 337 Sunk 7/2/43 by U 402 WALMER CASTLE 906/36 12/09/41 1 81 Sunk 29/1/41 by aircraft ZAAFARAN 1,567/21 23/03/41 26 220 Sunk 5/7/42 by aircraft ZAMALEK 1,565/21 26/02/41 68 665 Note: The Master of ZAMALEK claimed a total of 665 rescues, although shore records only list 611; the former figure has used. [/pre2] Personnel losses Two hundred and nine crew of the Rescue Ships were lost in the sinkings recorded above plus 22 known survivors onboard at the time. Distribution is as follows: PINTO 16 crew ST SUNNIVA 64 (total) crew STOCKPORT 63 (total) crew, plus any survivors on board at the time TOWARD 54 crew & 2 medical cases WALMER CASTLE 11 crew & 20 survivors ZAAFARAN 1 crew lost Rescue Trawlers An unusual position arose in 1943 regarding the Rescue Service. Two Rescue Ships had been lost early in the year, the number of trans-Atlantic convoys was increasing and the individual convoys were also much larger. Obviously, C-in-C Western Approaches became concerned about the ability of the Rescue Ships to cope, and requested replacements and a further increase in numbers. This was opposed by MOWT on the very valid grounds that the number of suitable vessels was now exceedingly limited, and they were required for trade purposes. This situation arose just prior to the defeat and withdrawal of U-boats from the North Atlantic in May 1943. The RN accepted the decision and decided to convert five corvettes then building to civilian-manned Rescue Ships. These incomplete hulls, and others, had become surplus to needs after the defeat of U-boats in the North Atlantic in May. Unfortunately, the transformation of mass-produced escorts to individually finished, specialised mercantile hulls involved extended building times, and these replacements would not be available for some twelve months. The increase in escort strength and change in the strategic situation had however also made the highly experienced A/S trawlers of Western Approaches Command less essential to the escort force strength. In consequence a number of these veterans were refitted for service as Rescue Trawlers. The conversion, in fact a modest refit, involved a slight reduction in A/S armament (as much to clear deck space as anything) and the provision of basic rescue equipment. The size of the ships precluded any provision of sickbay or operating facilities and only the most minimal accommodation for survivors. This is amply illustrated by the experience of NORTHERN SPRAY when with convoy ONS 5. When detached to St John's NF the 150 foot vessel carried 134 survivors additional to her own complement; her consort NORTHERN GEM had been detached earlier with a total of 78 survivors. The ships remained naval-manned (principally by their original Patrol Service crews) and were attached to convoys as an addition to an existing Rescue Ship. When no Rescue Ship was available, two Rescue Trawlers were usually attached to a single convoy. Where survivors were recovered, and the vastly smaller losses from mid-1943 onwards made this an infrequent occurrence, the trawler either transferred the survivors to the Rescue Ship at the earliest opportunity or detached to the nearest port to land them. The trawlers were capable of reverting to escort work, indeed a number did so and took part in convoy escort in the Channel in the post D-Day operations. A. Hague. The Allied Convoy System
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Barrett: cyr Спасибо!
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