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РЭБ в системе ПВО союзников при высадке в Нормандии
Nomat: Дэа френдс, Глупый вопрос (совсем отстал от жизни с этими авианосцами): что за аппаратуру "обнаружения излучения планирующих бомб" и постановки помех этому излучению получили старые амеровы ЛК ("Техас" точно) перед высадкой в Нормандии? Бомбы ведь не имели активной ГСН. Речь идет об обнаружении излучения управляющего радиоканала с самолёта-носителя и прицельной постановке помехи оному? Где можно почитать о самом этом железе и о результатах применения?
Ответов - 10
Miroslav: Приветствую! Прочитать про планирующие бомбы в тех аспекте можно, например, здесь: http://www.airwar.ru/weapon/ab/fx1400.html Была еще статья твоего покорного слуги в журнале "История авиации", но в сети ее нет. Вышлю мылом.
Nomat: Miroslav Спасибо. Еще бы про американское оборудование...
Miroslav: Ну а что там, собственно ты хотел бы увидеть? Аппаратура постановки помех радиоканалам УАБ применялась уже в ходе высадки у Анцио и достаточно эффективно.
Nomat: Miroslav Значит, уже тогда амеры знали частоты. Откуда? Нашли образец приемника или передатчика? Потом, какие точно номиналы частот? Было ли возможно их изменять? И наконец, какова результативность этих мер РЭБ? Есть ли данные, позволяющие привести конкретный пример срыва управления УАБ путем применения помех?
Miroslav: Уважаемый Nomat! До Анцио немцы применяли УАБ на протяжении полугода, так что надо думать у них имелись и пленные летчики из экипажей и образцы аппаратуры, хотя честно говоря на конкретные факты захватов я в литературе не натыкался. Но частоты могла вычислить и радиоразведка после того, как узнала сам принцип применения оружия и хотя бы приблизительно от пленных диапазон волн. Результативность мер вытекает из заметного снижения числа попаданий. Сравни результаты, достигнутые в заливе Салерно и в бухте Сены и все станет ясно. Дать конкретные примеры не могу, да и как это сделать? Как отличить просто промах, допущенный оператором, от промаха, допущенного по причине закрытия канала помехами? Канал-то был не слуховой и самого наличия помех оператор мог и не фиксировать.
Pr.Eugen: Nomat ,посмотрите "ЭМ США в ВМВ" Роско...АСТшный первый том...
Nomat: Miroslav пишет: Канал-то был не слуховой и самого наличия помех оператор мог и не фиксировать. Точно. Но амеры, применяя эти средства рЭБ, должны были как-то фиксировать хотя бы предполагаемый результат...
Miroslav: Nomat пишет: Но амеры, применяя эти средства рЭБ, должны были как-то фиксировать хотя бы предполагаемый результат... Думаю, они в нем убедились еще на полигонных испытаниях. Как контролировали в ходе б/д не встречал.
Nomat: Miroslav Приветствую! НашОл вот Фридмана - MISSILE JAMMING The other great wartime example of radio countermeasures was missile jamming. The Germans first flew antiship guided missiles in 1942, and in August 1943 they sank one corvette and damaged another in the Bay of Biscay using Hs 293 powered missiles. At the same time the Germans used a guided bomb (FX 1400) to sink the Italian battleship Roma. The latter weapons were the equivalent of modern 'smart bombs': they could be dropped beyond antiaircraft range and were essentially immune to fire. The only available countermeasures were electronic - which, in fact, proved so effective that the Germans had to abandon this form of attack after March 1944. The guided bomb used a series of signals in the 48-50 mc/s band, which were not particularly directional and so could be intercepted relatively easily. Jamming was another matter: the receiver on the bomb was quite directional, and it pointed up towards the bomber. At first the Allies were not certain of the character of the guidance signals. Two destroyer escorts, Frederick C. Davis and Herbert E. Jones, were hurriedly converted, with 15-300 mc/s search receivers and NRL-built 10-35 mc/s jammers, plus recording equipment. They reported to the Eighth Fleet on 15 October 1943. Both observed that guidance transmissions were actually in the 48-50 mc/s band, and their crews rebuilt the jamming gear accordingly. Even after the equipment had been rebuilt, Herbert C. Jones on one occasion waited long enough to record guidance signals before beginning to jam, so that more efficient jammers could be constructed. Two of the latter were available in time for Anzio in January 1944. In February all convoys from Oran to Bizerte had at least two ships equipped with jammers, and after that no ship in any protected convoy was hit by guided bombs. At Anzio, where the two original jammer ships protected the invasion, the enemy made 75 attacks and hit only five ships, two of which were not in the immediate area of the jammers. The Germans attempted guided bomb attacks both at Normandy and in southern France, but most missed; a postwar report recounted 'several examples. . . of glide bombs, headed directly for ships, which broke off under jamming and crashed into the sea'. By the time the war ended in the Mediterranean there were eight jamming ('J') ships, four destroyers and four minesweepers, using six sets of gear built in the United States and two built by technicians in the Eighth Fleet. The jamming antenna was a whip projecting from bridge or funnel at a 45° angle. Ultimately the jamming and intercept/recording functions were separated, the minesweeper Sustain regularly accompanying convoys to record German signals during attacks. Additional ships were fitted out for jamming at Normandy, and fifty more were provided for the invasion of southern France shortly thereafter. Similarly, a possible Japanese missile threat, which failed to materialize, occasioned the conversion of three more destroyer escorts. A 1945 account notes that 'Jamming was not easy. The receiving antenna on the bomb was so loaded as to discriminate sharply against signals from surface transmitters . . . Not only must the jammer be operated very nearly exactly on the carrier frequency of the control transmitter, but also the jammer modulation must be set to within two percent of one of the control modulating frequencies. The time of flight of the bomb was usually less than a minute; jammer operators were trained to intercept and jam within 15 seconds after the signal appeared.' However, according to the US history of wartime countermeasures, 'Intelligence reports received after V-E Day contained claims by the Germans that Allied jamming had not been the major cause for the disappearance of the enemy's guided missile attacks. They claimed that the real reasons were (1) that Allied air superiority prevented the parent aircraft from flying close enough to the targets and (2) that lucky hits by one of the attacking strategic air forces had destroyed all the aircraft equipped with the necessary installations and these were found very difficult to substitute. It is well known that the strategic situation of the enemy air arm deteriorated continuously during 1944, and it is clear that all of the above factors combined to make the danger of guided missiles less serious than it originally appeared. One result traceable to the use of countermeasures was that enemy scientists responsible for the development work became prejudiced against any type of radio control which was not very carefully protected against Allied jamming. The enemy development of new weapons was thereby slowed down considerably and the equipment designed became very complicated and difficult to build. By the end of WWII, no newly developed guided missile had seen operational use against Allied ships.' Radio and radar deception was also extremely important in the European landings. For example, a special force equipped with countermeasures sets and deception devices such as barrage balloons and corner reflectors simulated a large invasion force and succeeded in capturing islands off the Italian coast. Again according to the official history, 'A few boats, carrying countermeasures sets (intentionally made not completely effective) and deception devices of all descriptions, were able to simulate the existence of a force comprising battleships and other large vessels. As they approached the islands, surrender was requested from the enemy and was obtained solely on the basis of a bluff supported by the indications appearing on the enemy's radar scope. This tactic, originally used for the capture of islands off the coast of Naples, was repeated to simulate the approach of a landing force at a point north of the real beachhead at Salerno. This particular deception is credited with delaying by several days the operational employment of one of the enemy's crack divisions against our invading forces ... A substantial effort was also carried on to protect the main invading force at Salerno. Here the purpose was to use countermeasures to hide the exact spot of landing during the night before D-Day, even though it could not hide the fact that an operation was impending . . . One evidence of effectiveness was that several batteries of German 88's were firing very wildly, and in fact shells were fired over the convoys (protected by radar jammers) and landed on the opposite shore where there were some German troops. . .'Both radio and radar countermeasures were used at Normandy, the jammers there being carried aboard landing craft, with monitoring installations aboard some of the larger ships.
Miroslav: Спасибо. Очень интересно. Буду знать.
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